Information-theoretic resolution of perceptual WSS watermarking of non
  i.i.d. Gaussian signals by Pateux, Stéphane et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
81
1.
47
02
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
28
 N
ov
 20
08
Information-theoretic resolution of perceptual WSS
watermarking of non i.i.d. Gaussian signals
Gae¨tan Le Guelvouit, Ste´phane Pateux and Christine Guillemot
IRISA/INRIA, Campus de Beaulieu,
35042 Rennes Cedex, FRANCE
Tel: +33 2 99 84 73 60; fax: +33 2 99 84 25 31
e-mail: Gaetan.Le Guelvouit@irisa.fr
ABSTRACT
The theoretical foundations of data hiding have been re-
vealed by formulating the problem as message communica-
tion over a noisy channel. We revisit the problem in light
of a more general characterization of the watermark chan-
nel and of weighted distortion measures. Considering spread
spectrum based information hiding, we release the usual as-
sumption of an i.i.d. cover signal. The game-theoretic reso-
lution of the problem reveals a generalized characterization
of optimum attacks. The paper then derives closed-form ex-
pressions for the different parameters exhibiting a practical
embedding and extraction technique.
1 INTRODUCTION
Information hiding refers to nearly invisible embedding
of a message within a host signal. This paper focuses
on the data hiding problem, assuming a blind and sym-
metric system. In the spirit of a communication problem
one seeks the maximum rate of reliable transmission over
any hiding and attack strategies. This rate is called the
hiding capacity and depends on admissible distortion
levels and on the watermark channel characterization.
Watermarking is often regarded as a form of spread
spectrum communication with various forms of chan-
nel characterizations. The perceptual sensitivity of
the host signal is often taken into account for choos-
ing embedding sites and strength [1, 7]. The attacks
are often modelled as the addition of White Gaussian
noise (AWGN) [8, 4], or as linear filtering plus additive
noise [9, 3]. The authors in [10] show that the optimum
attack is obtained by Wiener filtering and that to be
maximally robust, the watermark should have a power
spectrum matching the one of the original signal.
The problem of robust embedding and extraction
based on spread spectrum is revisited here in light of
a more general model of the cover signal and of the wa-
termark channel. Most of the approaches introduced
so far consider that the cover signal can be modelled
as an ergodic wide sense stationary Gaussian random
process. This assumption is rarely satisfied for real sig-
nals. We assume instead that it can be modelled as the
realization of a set of independent non identically dis-
tributed Gaussian random variables (referred to as non
i.i.d. signals). The attack channel is considered to be of
the type amplitude scaling and additive white Gaussian
noise (SAWGN) [2]. The game-theoretic resolution of
the problem with weighted distortion measures leads to
a characterization of optimum attack domains. By max-
imizing the watermarking channel signal to noise ratio,
we then derive a closed-form expression of the water-
mark spectral density corresponding to the best defense.
The performance limits of the approach in terms of hid-
ing capacity are then analyzed. The approach can be
seen as a generalization of previous work to the case of
non i.i.d. Gaussian sources, considering weighted dis-
tortion measures and a more general SAWGN attack
channel, with the exhibition of closed-form expressions
for a practical embedding and extraction scheme.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let b = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} with bi ∈ {−1,+1} ∀i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} be the message to be embedded in a
host signal x. Many approaches introduced so far as-
sume that the signal x can be modelled as an ergodic
zero-mean wide sense stationary Gaussian random pro-
cess [4, 9]. This assumption is rarely satisfied for real
signals or for content adaptive watermarks. We as-
sume instead that the host signal x can be modelled
as the realization of a set of non stationary Gaus-
sian random variables X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xm} where
Xi ∼ N (0, σXi ). The information is then used as a key
for indexing pseudo-random noise sequences which are
additively combined with the signal. Let G be a n×m
matrix composed of n pseudo-random generated vectors
Gj ∈ {−1,+1}m. The watermarked signal is obtained
by
yi = xi + wi = xi + αi
n∑
j=1
Gi,jbj, (1)
where xi represents the i
th site of the host signal and yi
the corresponding watermarked site. In order to extract
each embedded bit bi, a correlation product between the
vector Gj and y is computed. The term αi is a weight-
ing factor allowing to adjust the amplitude (or energy)
of the mark. In the following we derive a closed-form
expression of this parameter in the case of SAWGN at-
1
tacks, with weighted distortion measures and non i.i.d
Gaussian cover signals. The attack channel is often as-
sumed to be AWGN [6]. This model assumes that the
distortion induced by the attack is independent of the
watermarked signal, hence can hardly apply to attacks
such as filtering and compression. More accurate mod-
els assuming that the distortion depends on the water-
marked signal and based on linear filtering plus additive
noise have been considered in [9, 3]. Here, we consider
that the attacked signal y′ can be expressed as
y′i = γiyi + δi = γixi + γiαi
n∑
j=1
Gi,jbj + δi, (2)
where γi is an attenuation factor on each watermarked
site. This amounts to consider the attack channel as
a SAWGN channel (amplitude scaling by the factor γi,
and additive white Gaussian noise of δi ∼ N (0, σ2δi)).
The distortion measure is defined as a weighted sum
of the MSE on each sample of the host signal, in order to
reflect the perceptual quality. The embedding distortion
is therefore given by
Dxy = E
[
m∑
i=1
ϕ2i (yi − xi)2
]
=
m∑
i=1
ϕ2inα
2
i , (3)
where ϕi is a perceptual factor. Similarly, the expected
attack distortion is given by
Dxy′ =
m∑
i=1
ϕ2i
(
σ2Xi (1− γi)2 + nγ2i α2i + σ2δi
)
. (4)
3 MAP WATERMARK ESTIMATION
The maximun a posteriori (MAP) estimation of the bit
bj is defined as
b̂j = argmax
bj
{
P (Bj = bj |Y ′m = y′)
}
. (5)
The a posteriori probability P = P (Bj = bj |Y ′m = y′)
can be rewritten (using Bayes law) as
P = P (Y
′m = y′ |Bj = bj)× P (Bj = bj)
P (Y ′m = y′)
. (6)
Since the received vector y′ is fixed, and that no a pri-
ori knowledge on the message b is assumed, we have
the a posteriori probability P ∝ P (Y ′m = y′ |Bj = bj),
where ∝ denotes an obvious renormalization. Assum-
ing that the watermarked sites are independent, it can
be shown [5] that the quantity can be expressed as a
product of Gaussian distributions of the form Pi ∼
N (0, γ2i (σ2Xi + α2i (n− 1)) + σ2δi), i.e. as
P ∝
m∏
i=1
1
√
2pi
√
γiσX2i + α
2
i (n− 1)) + σ2δi
exp
[
− (y
′
i − γiαibjGi,j)2
2
(
γ2i (σ
2
Xi
+ α2i (n− 1)) + σ2δi
)] , (7)
∝ C
2
exp
−Λ
2
, (8)
where C is a constant and
Λ =
n∑
j=1
(
bj − b̂j
)2
σ2bj
(9)
with
b̂j =
∑m
i=1
γiαiy
′
iGi,j
γ2i (σ
2
Xi
+α2i (n−1))+σ
2
δi∑m
i=1
γ2iα
2
i
γ2i (σ
2
Xi
+α2i (n−1))+σ
2
δi
, (10)
σ2bj =
(
m∑
i=1
γ2i α
2
i
γ2i (σ
2
Xi
+ α2i (n− 1)) + σ2δi
)
−1
. (11)
The term b̂j represents the optimal estimator. From
Eqn.(8) and (9), watermarking channel can be seen as a
gaussian channel. Estimator’s performance can be mea-
sured in terms of the signal to noise ratio Eb/N0 of the
watermarking channel. This quantity is defined as the
ratio between the energy of the embedded bit and the
overall noise introduced by the cover signal (σ2Xi ), by
the other embedded bits (α2i (n− 1)) and by the attack
(i.e. σ2δi). It is then expressed as
Eb
N0
=
E(b2j)
σ2bj
=
1
σ2bj
=
m∑
i=1
ρi, (12)
where
ρi =
α2i γ
2
i
γ2i (σ
2
Xi
+ α2i (n− 1)) + σ2δi
. (13)
4 GAME-THEORETIC RESOLUTION
The optimization of the embedding and attack param-
eters can be formulated as a game between an attacker
and a hider. The attack searches the two vectors γ and
σδ minimizing the extractor performance (i.e. Eb/N0)
while maintaining the distortion below an acceptable
level (Dxy′ < D
max
xy′ ). This problem can be solved by a
Lagrangian optimization:(
γ⋆, σδ⋆
)
= argmin
γ,σδ
{
Jλ =
Eb
N0
+ λ
[
Dxy′ −Dmaxxy′
]}
,
where λ > 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier. From Eqn.(4)
and (12) it appears that Jλ is an additive functional.
The optimization can then be made separately on each
Jλ,i given by
Jλ,i(γi, σδi) = ρi + λϕ
2
i
(
σ2Xi(1− γi)2 + nγ2i α2i + σ2δi
)
by setting its derivatives with respect to the attack pa-
rameters γi and σδi
∂Jλ,i
∂γi
= 2
γiα
2
iσ
2
δi(
γ2i
(
σ2Xi + α
2
i (n− 1)
)
+ σ2δi
)2
+2λϕ2i
(
nγiα
2
i − σ2Xi (1− γi)
)
, (14)
and
∂Jλ,i
∂σδi
=
−2γ2i α2i σδi(
γ2i
(
σ2Xi + α
2
i (n− 1)
)
+ σ2δi
)2 + 2λϕ2i σδi (15)
to zero on the validity domain. The resolution of the
resulting set of equations leads to the following two ex-
pressions for σ2δi :
2
σ2δi = −γi
[
nγiα
2
i − σ2Xi (1− γi)
]
(16)
and
σ2δi = γi
[
αi√
λϕi
− γi
(
σ2Xi + α
2
i (n− 1)
)]
. (17)
Equating Eqn.(16) and (17) leads to the optimum values
γ⋆i =
√
λϕiσ
2
Xi
− αi√
λϕiα2i
(18)
and
σ2δ⋆i = γ
⋆
i (γwi − γ⋆i )
(
σ2Xi + nα
2
i
)
, (19)
where γwi =
σ2Xi
σ2
Xi
+σ2wi
, and σ2wi = nα
2
i . The term γwi
represents the response of a Wiener filter. Since the
attack parameters σ2δ⋆i
and γ⋆i must verify σ
2
δ⋆i
≥ 0 and
γ⋆i ≥ 0, the solutions of Eqn.(18) and (19) are valid only
for
µ− αi ≥ 0 (20)
(αi − µ)
(
σ2Xi + nα
2
i
)
+ µα2i ≥ 0, (21)
where µ =
√
λϕiσ
2
Xi
. This set of inequations defines
three domains D1, D2 and D3 shown in Fig. 1.
The optimum attacks can then be characterized in
terms of the domains of validity of the attack param-
eters γi and σδi . Let us first consider their limits of
validity (γi = 0 and σδi = 0). If γ
⋆
i = 0 (the marked
value yi is erased), a minimum is obtained for σδ⋆
i
= 0.
A greater value for the additive noise will increase Dxy′
but will not decrease Eb/N0. This attack is referred to
as the Erase attack. If σδi = 0, another minimum is
given by γ⋆i = γwi. This attack is a Wiener filtering.
The last attack (defined for γ⋆i > 0 and for σδ⋆i > 0) is
a combination of filtering and additive Gaussian noise.
This is called here the Intermediate attack. Table 1
gives the corresponding expressions of the cost function
Jλ,i(γi, σδi) denoted JE , JW and JI for respectively the
erase, Wiener and intermediate attacks. To find the op-
timum attack, one has to find on each domain (defined
in terms of αi and σXi ), the attack that will minimize
Jλ,i(γi, σδi). From table 1 and constraints (20)-(21) the
minimum values of Jλ,i(γi, σδi), in the domains of valid-
ity of γi and σδi , are given by JE and JW on D1 and
D3 respectively (see [5] for details). Similarly, on D2,
JI ≤ JE and JI ≤ JW . Thus, if the validity constraint
γ⋆i ≥ 0 of the Intermediate attack domain is satisfied,
the optimum attack is given by the Intermediate attack
(with parameters given by Eqn.(18) and (19)). Other-
wise, the attacker should use instead the Erase or the
Wiener solution.
Figure 1: Domains defined by the validity constraints
γ⋆i ≥ 0 and σδ⋆i ≥ 0 (λ = 0.2, χ = 0.002, n = 1 bit).
Value of Jλ,i(γi, σδi)
JE λϕ
2
i σ
2
Xi
JW
α2i
σ2Xi
+α2i (n−1)
+ λ
nϕ2iα
2
iσ
2
Xi
σ2Xi
+nα2i
JI 2
√
λϕi
σ2Xi
αi
− 1 + λϕ2i σ2Xi
(
1− σ
2
Xi
α2i
)
Table 1: Cost function Jλ,i(γi, σδi) for the different types
of attack (Erase, Wiener, Intermediate).
Given the optimum attack, we then search the pa-
rameters αi (strength of the watermark) that maximize
Eb/N0, under constraints of a maximum watermarked
signal distortion (Dmaxxy ). This leads to a Lagrangian
approach:
α⋆ = argmax
α
{
Jχ = Jλ − χ
[
Dxy −Dmaxxy
]}
, (22)
where χ > 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier. The
cost function Jχ being the additive functional Jχ =∑m
i Jλ,i(γi, σδi) − χ
[
Dxy −Dmaxxy
]
, the optimization
can be carried out separately on each Jχ,i(αi) =
Jλ,i(γi, σδi) − χnϕ2iα2i . Let us consider the three at-
tack strategies. In the case of the Erase attack, i.e.
(αi, σXi) ∈ D1, Jχ,i(αi) = λϕ2i σ2Xi −χnϕ2iα2i . The func-
tion Jχ,i(αi) is a decreasing function and the minimum
valid value of αi is given by α
⋆
i =
√
λϕiσ
2
Xi
. In D2,
setting the derivative
∂Jχ,i
∂αi
= −2
√
λϕiσ
2
Xi
α2i
+ 2
λϕ2i σ
4
Xi
α3i
− 2χnϕ2iαi (23)
to zero leads to µ2 − µαi − χnϕ2iα4i = 0 where µ =√
λϕiσ
2
Xi
. The derivative is negative for αi = µ and
positive for αi = 0. The polynomial being monotonous
on the interval [0;µ], one can conclude that Eqn.(23) has
a valid solution on [0;µ]. If the derivative is negative on
D2, the solution adopted is αi such that µα2i = (µ −
αi)(σ
2
Xi
+ nα2i ). Let nα
2
i = σ
2
Wi
, nλ = λ′ and nχ = χ′.
Let us assume that σ2Wi is very close to α
2
i (n−1). In the
Wiener case ((γi, σδi) ∈ D3), the cost function Jχ,i(αi)
expressed in terms of σ2Wi = nα
2
i is given by
Jχ,i(σ
2
Wi ) =
(
1 + λ′ϕ2iσ
2
Xi
) σ2Wi
σ2Wi + σ
2
Xi
−χ′ϕ2iσ2Wi . (24)
Setting the derivative of Jχ,i(σ
2
Wi
) with respect to σ2Wi
∂Jχ,i
∂σ2Wi
=
(
1 + λ′ϕ2i σ
2
Xi
) σ2Xi(
σ2Wi + σ
2
Xi
)2 − χ′ϕ2i (25)
to zero, given that σ2Wi = nα
2
i , leads to
α⋆i =
√√√√σXi√1 + λ′ϕ2i σ2Xi −√χ′ϕiσ2Xi√
χ′nϕi
. (26)
This provides a closed-form of the optimum embedding
parameter αi in terms of the host signal power spectrum
(σ2Xi) and for an SAWGN attack. The Wiener filtering
can restore the signal, hence may lead to Dxy′ < Dxy.
This can be avoided by filtering the watermarked sig-
nal (after embedding). The distortion measure is then
3
Figure 2: Optimum values of αi for λ = 0.002, χ =
0.0028 and n = 100 bits.
Figure 3: Performances of the proposed scheme in pres-
ence of a compression attack JPEG.
Dxy =
∑m
i=1 ϕ
2
i
σ2Xi
σ2Wi
σ2
Xi
+σ2
Wi
, where σ2Wi = nα
2
i . The reso-
lution of the problem leads to new parameters (see [5]
for details): α⋆i ≃
√
λϕiσ
2
Xi
. Fig. 2 illustrates the vari-
ations of the parameter αi in terms of σ
2
Xi
for both ap-
proaches i.e., without (bold curve) and with a Wiener
post-filtering (light curve) of the watermarked signal
(with ϕi = (1 + σXi )
−1/2). Unlike [1], it can be ob-
served that for high values of σ2Xi , no watermark can be
robustly embedded on the corresponding sites.
5 RESULTS
The approach has been tested on images against tech-
niques using αi = constant, and αi = c|xi| [6], consider-
ing embedding in the wavelet transform domain. Fig. 3
depicts the respective Eb/N0 performances in terms of
the attack distortion. A message of 156 bits is embed-
ded (i.e. n = 156) in the 512 × 512 gray scale Lena
image (i.e. m = 262 144). The Lagragian multipliers λ
and χ are set so that Dxy = D
max
xy and Dxy′ = D
max
xy′ .
The embedding parameters have been tuned in order to
get the same perceptual distortion Dxy/m = 1 (with
ϕi = (1 + σXi)
−1/2) with the different techniques. The
watermarked image has been attacked with a lossy com-
pression JPEG, from 95% to 5% quality. The tests, us-
ing the Stirmark benchmark have shown that the tech-
nique is robust to all the non-geometric attacks.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper provides an information-theoretic analysis
of information hiding in non i.i.d signals with percep-
tual distortion metrics. Note that previous work, when
considering perceptual watermaking was often led by
intuition. Here we have derived closed-form expressions
of the different extraction and embedding parameters,
revealing an efficient and practical information hiding
system.
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